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Abstract—In this article we present the Hayastan Shakarian
(HS), a robustness index for complex networks. HS measures the
impact of a network disconnection (edge) while comparing the
sizes of the remaining connected components. Strictly speaking,
the Hayastan Shakarian index is defined as edge removal that
produces the maximal inverse of the size of the largest connected
component divided by the sum of the sizes of the remaining ones.
We tested our index in attack strategies where the nodes
are disconnected in decreasing order of a specified metric. We
considered using the Hayastan Shakarian cut (disconnecting the
edge with max HS) and other well-known strategies as the
higher betweenness centrality disconnection. All strategies were
compared regarding the behavior of the robustness (R-index)
during the attacks. In an attempt to simulate the internet
backbone, the attacks were performed in complex networks with
power-law degree distributions (scale-free networks).
Preliminary results show that attacks based on disconnecting
using the Hayastan Shakarian cut are more dangerous (decreasing
the robustness) than the same attacks based on other centrality
measures.
We believe that the Hayastan Shakarian cut, as well as other
measures based on the size of the largest connected component,
provides a good addition to other robustness metrics for complex
networks.
I. INTRODUCTION
Networks are present in human life in multiple forms from
social networks to communication networks (such as the Inter-
net), and they have been widely studied as complex networks
of nodes and relationships, describing their structure, relations,
etc. Nowadays, studies go deep into network knowledge, and
using standard network metrics such as degree distribution
and diameter one can determine how robust and/or resilient
a network is.
Even though both terms (robustness and resilience) have
been used with the same meaning, we will consider robustness
as the network inner capacity to resist failures, and resilience
as the ability of a network to resist and recover after such fail-
ures. However, both terms have in common the methodology
for testing robustness and/or resilience. Usually, they consist
on planned attacks against nodes failures or disconnections,
from a random set of failures to more elaborated strategies
using well known network metrics.
We consider that an “adversary” should plan a greedy strat-
egy aiming to maximize damage with the minimum number
of strikes. We present a new network impact metric called
the Hayastan Shakarian index (HS), which reflects the size
of the larger connected component after removing a network
edge. Then, we plan a greedy strategy called the Hasyastan
Shakarian cut (HSc), which is to remove the edge with higher
HS value, aiming to partition the network in same-sized
connected components, and recalculating the network HSs
after each cut. We discuss the performance of attacks based
on the Hayastan Shakarian cut and the edge betweenness
centrality metric [3], compared by the robustness index (R-
index). Our main conclusion is that the first strikes of the
strategy the Hayastan Shakarian cut strategy causes more
“damage” than the classical betweenness centrality metric in
terms of network disconnection (R-index).
The article is organized as follows, next section presents
related work, followed by the definition of the Hayastan
Shakarian cut, its attacking strategy, and its simulation results
in Section III. Conclusions are presented in Section IV.
II. RELATED WORK
Over the last decade, there has been a huge interest in the
analysis of complex networks and their connectivity prop-
erties [2]. During the last years, networks and in particular
social networks have gained significant popularity. An in-
depth understanding of the graph structure is key to convert
data into information. To do so, complex networks tools have
emerged [1] to classify networks [21], detect communities [8],
determine important features and measure them [3].
Concerning robustness metrics, betweenness centrality de-
serves special attention. Betweenness centrality is a metric that
determines the importance of an edge by looking at the paths
between all of the pairs of remaining nodes. Betweenness has
been studied as a resilience metric for the routing layer [16]
and also as a robustness metric for complex networks [6]
and for internet autonomous systems networks [9] among
others. Betweenness centrality has been widely studied and
standardized as a comparison base for robustness metrics, thus
in this study it will be used for performance comparison.
Another interesting edge-based metrics are: the increase of
distances in a network caused by the deletion of vertices and
edges [7]; the mean connectivity [19], that is, the probability
that a network is disconnected by the random deletion of
edges; the average connected distance (the average length of
the shortest paths between connected pairs of nodes in the
network) and the fragmentation (the decay of a network in
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terms of the size of its connected components after random
edge disconnections) [2]; the balance-cut resilience, that is,
the capacity of a minimum cut such that the two resulting
vertex sets contain approximately the same number (similar
to the HS-index but aiming to divide the network only in
halves [20], not in equal sized connected components); the
effective diameter (“the smallest h such that the number of
pairs within a h-neighborhood is at least r times the total
number of reachable pairs” [11]); and the Dynamic Network
Robustness (DYNER) [15], where a backup path between
nodes after a node disconnection and its length is used as
a robustness metric in communication networks.
The idea of planning a “network attack” using centrality
measures has captured the attention of researchers and prac-
titioners nowadays. For instance, Sterbenz et al. [17] used
betweenness-centrality (bcen) for planning a network attack,
calculating the bcen value for all nodes, ordering nodes from
higher to lower bcen, and then attacking (discarding) those
nodes in that order. They have shown that disconnecting only
two of the top bcen-ranked nodes, their packet-delivery ratio is
reduced to 60%, which corresponds to 20% more damage than
other attacks such as random links or nodes disconnections,
tracked by link-centrality and by node degrees.
A similar approach and results were presented by C¸etin-
kaya et al. [4]. They show that after disconnecting only 10
nodes in a network of 100+ nodes the packet-delivery ratio is
reduced to 0%. Another approach, presented as an improved
network attack [12], [18], is to recalculate the betweenness-
centrality after the removal of each node [5], [10]. They show
a similar impact of non-recalculating strategies but discarding
sometimes only half of the equivalent nodes.
In the study of resilience after edge removing, Rosenkratz
et al. [13] study backup communication paths for network
services defining that a network is “k-edge-failure-resilient if
no matter which subset of k or fewer edges fails, each resulting
subnetwork is self-sufficient” given that “the edge resilience of
a network is the largest integer k such that the network is k-
edge-failure-resilient”.
For a better understanding of network attacks and strategies,
see [5], [10], [12], [18].
III. THE HAYASTAN SHAKARIAN CUT
Given a network N of size N , we denote by C(N \ e) the
set of connected components in N after disconnecting edge e.
The Hayastan Shakarian index (HS-index) for an edge e in
N is defined as follows:
HSN (e) =

∑
c∈C(N\e) ‖c‖
maxc∈C(N\e)‖c‖
− 1, if ‖C(N \ e)‖ 6= ‖C(N )‖
0 otherwise
(1)
where ‖c‖, with c ∈ C(N \ e), is the size of the connected
component c of the network N after disconnecting edge e.
Notice that HSN (e) reflects the partition of a network in
several sub-networks after the disconnection of edge e and how
these sub-networks remain interconnected. Strictly speaking,
it compares in size the core network (the largest connected
component) with the other remaining sub-networks. HSN
takes values between 0 (the whole network remains connected)
to N − 1 (the whole network is disconnected).
Then, we define that the Hayastan Shakarian cut as the
one that disconnects the node with the highest HS-index value
(when there is more than one, we choose it at random). That
is:
HSc = N \ eˆ,where eˆ = max(HSN (e)) ∀ e ∈ N
(a) Original network
(b) HS removing (c) BC removing
Fig. 1. Effects of removing edges by (b) its maximal HS, and (c) its maximal
betweenness centrality value.
A. Network Attack Plan
If we plan a network attack by disconnecting nodes with a
given strategy (e.g. Figure 1), it is widely accepted to compare
it against the use of betweenness centrality metric, because the
latter reflects the importance of an edge in the network [6].
These attack strategies are compared by means of the Unique
Robustness Measure (R-index) [14], defined as:
R =
1
N
N∑
Q=1
s(Q), (2)
where N is the number of nodes in the network and s(Q)
is the fraction of nodes in the largest connected component
after disconnecting (remove the edges among connected
components) Q nodes using a given strategy. Therefore, the
higher the R-index, the better in terms of robustness. Our
strategy is:
In each step, (re)compute the HS index for all the edges,
and perform the Hayastan Shakarian cut.
B. Simulations
In an attempt to study the behavior of the internet back-
bone, we test our strategy in simulated power-law degree
distributions with exponents α ∈ {1.90, 2.00, 2.05, 2.10, 2.20}
using Gephi. A power-law distribution is one that can be
approximated by the function f(x) = k ∗ x−α, where k and
α are constants. For each α, we simulate 50 networks of size
1000 (i.e., with 1000 nodes). Then, we tested and compared
strategies ranked in terms of the R-index.
Instead of just comparing the robustness, after the removal
of all of the nodes, we studied the behavior of the attacks
after only a few strikes. To do so, we define a variant of the
R-index which takes into account only the first n strikes of an
attack. Thus, for a simultaneous attack (where the nodes are
ranked by a metric only once at the beginning), the Rn-index
is defined as:
Rn =
1
n
n∑
Q=1
s(Q). (3)
For a sequential attack, the order of node disconnection is
recomputed after each disconnection. Similar to the R-index,
notice that the lower the Rn-index, the more effective the
attack is, since that gives us a higher reduction of robustness.
Results are shown in Figure 2. We tested sequential attacks:
At each strike, the next node to disconnect was the one with the
highest metric (whether it be HSc or betweenness centrality)
in the current network. The figure shows the behavior of the
Rn-index in 50 scale-free networks (generated as before) with
exponent 1.9 to 2.2. The Hayastan Shakarian cut proves to
be very effective in attacks with only a few disconnections.
Moreover, it shows that the effectiveness persists over the
number of strikes in scale-free networks with lower exponent.
It is interesting to note that, no matter the metric used,
the damage decreases in the long term with the number of
strikes. Revisiting the definition of network robustness, that
is, “a measure of the decrease of network functionality under
a sinister attack”[5], it is important to notice that R-index
is a metric for a general view of robustness, and it gives
no information of how fast the network is disconnected. We
suggest that weighted versions of the R-index could be a good
compromise. This is the case of the Rn-index proposed above
which takes into account the removal of only a percentage
of the best ranked nodes (or until the network reaches its
percolation threshold [5]) could be a more useful metric for
robustness and/or resilience in worst-case scenarios.
We start analyzing what would be the worst “attack”. In the
worst case, a “malicious adversary” will try to perform the
maximum damage with the minimum number of strikes, that
is, with the minimum number of node disconnections (made
by the attacker).
In terms of decreasing the size of the largest connected
component, the Hayastan Shakarian cut is the best attack
strategy during the first strikes. It achieves the disconnection
of more than a quarter of the network only after 200 strikes for
α = 2.10 and after 150 strikes for α = 2.05 (see Figure 2). It
is important to notice that the greater the value of α the lower
the number of strikes needed by the Hayastan Shakarian cut
for reducing the original network to a connected component
of 0.75 of the original size.
C. Revisiting the Hayastan Shakarian cut
Concerning the attacking strategies, it is important to notice
that the Hayastan Shakarian cut was designed for disconnect-
ing the network from the first strikes, aiming to get connected
components with similar sizes. This is the main reason of
its better performance compared to the betweenness centrality
metric in a worst-attack scenario. For instance, in Figure 2 we
present examples where the HS cut performs better attacks
than an strategy using the betweenness centrality metric for
different values of α. Notice that the Hayastan Shakarian cut
performs better than the edge betweenness centrality strategy
for values α < 2.1, disconnecting the former more than the
half of the network in less strikes than the latter.
Given that for a high coefficient (of the power law) the net-
work would have a densely connected core with a few nodes,
and many nodes of degree 1. In this case a Hayastan Shakarian
cut will not be as effective as an edge betweenness attack since
the HS-index of the nodes in the core is probably 0 (because is
highly connected), performing a Hayastan Shakarian cut over
those edges attached to nodes of degree 1.
On the other hand, for a low coefficient (of the power law)
the proportion of high degree nodes and low degree nodes is
more similar than those of a high coefficient, this means the
network is well connected even if it is not densely connected.
In this case the Hayastan Shakarian cut will not cause that
much damage (because the network is well connected) but it
still causes more damage than edge betweenness, because edge
betweenness chooses the edges with high traffic, and since the
network is well connected it has many paths between any two
nodes. Instead the Hayastan Shakarian cut will keep choosing
the edges that causes more nodes to be disconnected.
Betweenness “generates” weak points by removing the
edges with high traffic until there are no more alternative paths
between 2 nodes. On the other hand the Hayastan Shakarian
cut finds weak points that are already on the network (before
removing a single edge, see Figure: 1). Therefore, the Hayas-
tan Shakarian cut will not produce a network necessarily
weaker, but a more fragmented and with stronger fragments.
It is important to notice that there is a breaking point
where Hayastan Shakarian cut is no longer the best attacking
strategy. As shown in Figure 2, this breaking point appears
after the largest connected component is less than 1/4 of
the original network. While an edge betweenness attack starts
attacking the edges in the core with high traffic, this will not
produce loss of nodes in the beginning but after a number of
edge removals, making the network weak and vulnerable to
the point where a single additional edge removal may greatly
reduce the fractional size of the largest component, in our
(a) α = 1.9 (b) α = 2.0 (c) α = 2.05 (d) α = 2.1 (e) α = 2.2
Fig. 2. Size of the largest fractional connected component (Y-axis) vs. number of disconnected edges (X-axis) using as strategies the Hayastan Shakarian
cut (blue) and edge betweenness centrality (red).
examples, of around 0.1. After the breaking point and for the
same number of edges removed by the Hayastan Shakarian
cut the fractional size of the largest component will be higher
than the one produced by a edge betweenness attack.
Another interesting property of HS-index occurs when
max(HSN (e)) = 0. In other words, when the Hayastan
Shakarian index is 0 for any node. In that case, the full
network will remain connected no matter which edge is
disconnected. Therefore, we suggest a resilience metric as
the number (or percentage) of disconnected nodes until
max(HSN (e)) > 0, a pre-defined threshold, or the percolation
threshold [5].
IV. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In this article we have presented the Hayastan Shakarian
cut (HSc), a robustness index for complex networks defined
as the inverse of the size of the remaining largest connected
component divided by the sum of the sizes of the remaining
connected components.
We tested our index as a measure to quantify the impact
of node removal in terms of the network robustness metric
R-index. We compared HSc with other attacks based on well-
known centrality measures (betweenness centrality) for node
removal selection. The attack strategy used was sequential
targeted attack, where every index is recalculated after each
removal, and the highest one is selected for the next extraction.
Preliminary results show that the Hayastan Shakarian cut
performs better compared to a betweenness centrality-based
attack in terms of decreasing the network robustness in the
worst-attack scenario (disconnecting more than the half of the
network) for values of α < 2.1. We suggest that the Hayastan
Shakarian cut, as well as other measures based on the size of
the largest connected component, provides a good addition to
other robustness metrics for complex networks.
As future work, we can study improving through new
connections an already existing network to make it more robust
to attacks, and we can study networks in which the topological
space is correlated with the cost of nodes disconnections,
nodes which are nearby have a lower cost to be disconnected
compared with nodes which are far apart.
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